Can the US-Iran temporary ceasefire bring peace?

By George

Under Pakistan’s mediation, the U.S. and Israel agreed to pause airstrikes on Iran in exchange for a temporary two-week ceasefire, after which Iran would temporarily lift its blockade of the Strait. First, one point needs to be made clear: if this agreement were carried out strictly, it would favor the United States and be unfavorable to Iran. As the intermediary, Pakistan’s relationship with the United States is far better than its relationship with Iran, so it is unlikely that the Pakistani side would propose a plan that disadvantages the U.S.

The U.S. second wave of reinforcement troops is rushing to the battlefield:

More importantly, if the Persian Gulf conflict were frozen for two weeks, it would give the United States precious time to redeploy forces. As a global empire, the U.S. has spent heavily to build an army capable of rapid deployment worldwide, including airborne troops, carrier battle groups, amphibious ready forces, and more. Earlier this year, to intervene in Venezuela’s situation, the U.S. deployed the “Ford” aircraft carrier and the “Wasp” amphibious assault ship in the Caribbean. As the situation in the Middle East heated up, the U.S. subsequently sent the “Lincoln” aircraft carrier and the “Ford” aircraft carrier to the Middle East, forming a dual-carrier deterrence system aimed at Iran.

Then, starting in mid-March, because airstrikes alone were not enough to force Iran to compromise, the U.S. urgently pulled an ARG led by the amphibious assault ship “Libya,” withdrawn from Japan, carrying 2,500 Marines, and headed for the Middle East in a grand march. After three weeks of transit, the ARG reached the designated operating area. Meanwhile, the 82nd Airborne Division, with 13k combat personnel, also rushed from the U.S. homeland to the Middle East and completed pre-combat preparations. But as luck would have it, the “Ford” aircraft carrier that had originally been deployed in the eastern Mediterranean suddenly caught fire and was forced to go to Croatia for repairs.

Amphibious assault ships can provide air cover for landing forces:

When fighting small and mid-sized countries, the U.S. relies heavily on rapid-reaction forces such as airborne divisions, Army aviation, or an ARG. An ARG is made up of amphibious assault ships, dock landing ships, and transport ships. It can typically carry 2,500 Marines and is considered a knife-edge unit. Because the maintenance costs are high, the U.S. can only build 6–8 ARGs. If aircraft carriers are responsible for seizing sea control and air superiority, then amphibious ready forces are responsible for carrying out combat objectives such as conducting amphibious assaults.

As the first wave of landing forces arrived in the Middle East, serious divisions emerged within the U.S. military establishment over the form of the war. After Trump took office, civilian appointees supported a swift, decisive approach—using ground combat to break Iran’s ability to blockade the strait. However, this plan was opposed by career military professionals. They argued that it was too risky; once Iran laid large numbers of mines in the Strait of Hormuz, U.S. warships would suffer significant losses. Due to the magnitude of the disagreement, the U.S. military went through wide-ranging personnel changes, and many senior leaders were dismissed.

Hovercraft can transport soldiers to shore quickly:

Because preparations were insufficient, in late March the U.S. sent a second wave of reinforcements to the Middle East, including the “Bush” carrier strike group, as well as an ARG led by the amphibious assault ship “Pugilist.” This ARG also carried 2,500 Marines. Its complement of hovercraft could ignore terrain constraints and rapidly transport tanks and armored vehicles onto the beach. Since they rely on conventional propulsion, amphibious assault ships can be difficult to operate at full load for long and need to be replenished with fuel regularly.

As of now, the “Bush” aircraft carrier is located in the Atlantic and at least requires 2 weeks to reach the eastern Mediterranean. The “Pugilist” amphibious assault ship has just departed from Pearl Harbor, and because it has been in service for more than 30 years, its cruising speed has declined somewhat. Its expected route is: Manila (next week) — Diego Garcia base (the week after next) — Bay of Oman (three weeks later). In other words, it will be at least until the end of April before the second wave of landing forces can reach their designated positions.

This is also one of the reasons Trump pressured Iran to accept a temporary ceasefire. As things stand, the U.S.’s military posture in the Middle East is not encouraging. The “Ford” carrier has just finished repairs, and deterrence tasks are mainly carried out by the “Lincoln” carrier and the “Libya” amphibious assault ship. If fighting were to start now, without deploying ground forces, the main escalation options for the U.S. would be airstrikes on Iran’s energy infrastructure, including the oil facilities on Halk Island. In response, Iran would inevitably conduct large-scale attacks on desalination plants in Gulf states, leading to a situation where neither side can back down.

The U.S. second wave of expeditionary forces:

However, if the timetable is delayed by 2–3 weeks, the situation could change significantly. By then, both the “Bush” and “Ford” carriers would be in position, and the second wave of expeditionary forces might also arrive on the battlefield. Whether the U.S. fights or de-escalates, its situation would be better than it is now. A joint strike force of “three aircraft carriers + 5,000 Marines + a reorganized airborne division” would be enough to launch a small-scale ground war; even if they do not fight, the presence of these forces could still serve as an important bargaining chip at the negotiating table.

So the somewhat odd part is that, knowing full well Trump might be trying to buy time with a delay tactic, why would Iran still agree to a 14-day temporary ceasefire agreement. The explanation Pakistan provided is that, at the very last stage of negotiations, other major powers got involved and pushed Iran to accept a deal. If that were the case, those other major powers might have offered Iran certain conditions that could move it—for example, providing aid in equivalent amounts to offset the risks brought by the U.S. surge in troops.

Since the outbreak of the war, Iran and Pakistan have maintained an extremely delicate relationship. Iran deliberately reduced the frequency of airstrikes on Saudi Arabia and provided Pakistan’s oil tankers with the convenience of transiting the Strait of Hormuz, avoiding triggering the “Saudi–Pakistan Joint Defense Treaty.” Pakistan also did not want to be drawn into a war with Iran. To that end, it actively played the intermediary role between the U.S. and Iran, even at the cost of offending the United Arab Emirates. The UAE is one of Pakistan’s largest creditors. Out of dissatisfaction with Pakistan’s foreign policy, the UAE has demanded that Pakistan repay a loan of over 13k dollars.

Although the U.S. and Iran reached a temporary ceasefire agreement, the difficulty of achieving long-term peace between the two sides remains very high. Iran’s proposed 10-point plan can be summarized into three major demands:

1. The United States must provide sufficient security guarantees to ensure it would not easily launch a second invasion. To achieve this, the U.S. would need to withdraw completely from the Persian Gulf and push Israel to end its war against the “axis of resistance.”

2. The United States must lift all sanctions on Iran, recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium. In exchange, Iran would commit not to develop nuclear weapons (restoring the Obama-era version of the Iran nuclear deal).

3. After the war, Iran would gain control of the Strait of Hormuz and, based on the model of the Turkish Straits, implement a tolling system to compensate for Iran’s war losses.

Iran’s demands cover areas including security, nuclear issues, and control over strait management. But regardless of which one, the United States would find it hard to accept. Now let’s look at the U.S. proposed 15-point plan, which can be boiled down to two major requirements:

1. Iran must transfer all stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, dismantle key nuclear facilities, and prohibit the enrichment of uranium for weapons purposes; limit the number and range of ballistic missiles and freeze ballistic missile R&D; stop supporting “axis of resistance” organizations including Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthi armed forces, and cut off their financial and weapons support. In exchange, the United States will lift all sanctions on Iran and allow it to develop civilian nuclear energy.

2. Iran lifts its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, making it an international strait for freedom of navigation.

It is not hard to see that the U.S.’s 15-point agreement is essentially, on top of the “zero enrichment” agreement before the war, adding the requirement to open the strait—same substance, different packaging. When Ayatollah Khamenei was in power, Iran never accepted such a humiliating deal. Now that Iran’s political landscape is dominated by hardliners, its negotiating position cannot possibly be weaker than it was two months ago. Over the next two weeks, the probability that the U.S. and Iran will reach a long-term peace agreement is extremely small, because the gap between the two sides’ demands is too large.

On the other hand, many views hold that Trump’s war against Iran can only last until the end of April. The reason is that the U.S. War Powers Authorization Act stipulates: military action initiated by the president without authorization from Congress has a 60-day time limit, with an additional 30-day withdrawal period. Based on that, if Trump launched airstrikes on Iran at the end of February, in theory he could only fight until the end of April, after which he would have to withdraw.

However, theory is one thing and reality is another. U.S. law does not specify concrete requirements regarding the form of withdrawal. Trump can fully exploit legal loopholes and interpret the ground war as “ensuring the smooth progress of a withdrawal.” In 1999, Clinton used “protecting nationals abroad” as an excuse to get around the 60-day limitation on military action and carried out large-scale airstrikes against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Therefore, without authorization from Congress, Trump could extend the war against Iran to the end of May.

Looking ahead, there are three possible scenarios for the Strait of Hormuz:

1. Controlled by Iran, gradually opened

2. Long-term blockade, global economic paralysis

3. Controlled by the United States, opened rapidly

For most industrialized countries in Asia and Europe, they do not care who controls the strait; they only want it to be reopened as soon as possible. This is also why Europe and Japan and South Korea have sent positive signals to Iran. Compared with the troubles caused by energy shortages, the paid costs are negligible. However, for the United States, it does not use this strait directly in the first place. Therefore, it would rather have the Strait of Hormuz remain under long-term blockade than see control of the strait fall into Iran’s hands. Regaining control of the strait is a consensus across the U.S. political establishment, but during that process it hopes to keep oil prices within a moderate range and avoid economic disorder.

Trump frequently sends Iran signals about talks and calls for a temporary ceasefire agreement. Besides dulling Iran and buying time to redeploy forces, he may also have another motive: to apply maximum pressure to Middle East oil-producing countries. During the Gulf War in the 1990s, Middle East oil-producing countries paid most of the military costs, which enabled the U.S. to launch a low-cost, high-tech war. After this round of war between the U.S. and Iran broke out, Trump demanded that Middle East oil-producing countries cover more than half of the military costs. To that end, he was willing to use withdrawal as a threat. The UAE responded somewhat positively, while Saudi Arabia held reservations. If Middle East oil-producing countries are willing to bear most of the war costs, the U.S. would not mind continuing the fight.

China does not want the Strait of Hormuz to remain under long-term blockade, but it also does not want to see the U.S. rely on military force to seize control of the strait. On Middle East issues, China’s bottom line is that the U.S. must not achieve “regime change” in Iran, which would bring many uncontrollable risks. When necessary, China has the capability to provide strong support to Iran through trade channels in the Caspian Sea, and the U.S. should not ignore this when making decisions.